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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a).
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the Labor Commission applied the correct standard for legal causation as
established by Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-106(2)?
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-106
(1) Physical, mental, or emotional diseases related to mental stress arising out of
and in the course of employment shall be compensable under this chapter only when
there is a sufficient legal and medical causal connection between the employee's disease
and employment.
(2)(a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary mental stress arising
predominantly and directly from employment.
(b) The extraordinary nature of the alleged mental stress is judged according to an
objective standard in comparison with contemporary national employment and
nonemployment life.
(3) Medical causation requires proof that the physical, mental, or emotional
disease was medically caused by the mental stress that is the legal cause of the physical,
mental, or emotional disease.
(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including disciplinary actions, work
evaluations, job transfers, layoffs, demotions, promotions, terminations, or retirements,
may not form the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this chapter.
1

(5) Alleged discrimination, harassment, or unfair labor practices otherwise
actionable at law may not form the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this
chapter.
(6) An employee who alleges a compensable occupational disease involving
mental stress bears the burden of proof to establish legal and medical causation by a
preponderance of the evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a Petition for Review seeking review of the final order of the Appeals
Board of the Utah Labor Commission. The issue presented is an issue of first impression
in this Court.
Petitioner, Nancy M. Wood, filed an Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor
Commission on February 26, 2001 seeking disability compensation for employment
related mental stress. (R. page 1). Administrative Law Judge Debbie Hahn held a
hearing on Mrs. Wood's claim for disability on March 6, 2002. (R. page 149). ALJ
Hahn issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Interim Order on August 20, 2002,
finding that Mrs. Wood suffered a compensable occupational disease in the course and
scope of her employment at Eastern Utah Broadcasting. (R. page 50-51). The ALJ also
dismissed the Employer's Reinsurance Fund from the case finding that Mrs. Wood's
claim did not arise until after July 1, 1994, the last date on which the Employer's
Reinsurance fund could have had liability on this claim.1 (R. page 76). Finally, the ALJ

1

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-702 provides that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund has no
liability for industrial accidents occurring after July 1, 1994.
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referred the claim to a medical panel to determine the portion of Mrs. Wood's current
medical condition attributable to the industrial disease claim. (R. page 53-54).
The Medical Panel issued a report dated November 12, 2002, finding that 50% of
Mrs. Wood's current medical condition was attributable to the industrial disease claim.
(R. pages 56-61). ALJ Hahn issued a decision that incorporated the findings from her
Interim Order and the medical panel findings on July 30, 2003. (R. pages 65-77). The
ALJ ordered the respondents to begin paying Ms. Wood weekly benefits and 50%> of
reasonable medical care. (R. page 76).
Respondents filed a Motion for Review with the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor
Commission on August 29, 2003. (R. pages 83-130). On October 18, 2004, the Appeals
Board issued its decision reversing the ALJ's decision and granting the respondents
Motion for Review. (R. page 138-143). The Appeals board found that Mrs. Wood had
not shown that the mental stress she had experienced was extraordinary when objectively
compared with the normal stress of the modern work environment. (R. page 141). The
Appeals Board decision was the final decision of the Labor Commission in this case.
Mrs. Wood filed a Petition for Review with this Court on November 15, 2004, seeking
review of the Labor Commission's final decision. (R. pages 145 & 147).
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mrs. Wood was employed by Eastern Utah Broadcasting ("EUB") beginning in
1980. (Hearing page 23).2 She stayed with the company until March 16, 2000, when she
was forced to leave because of a nervous breakdown. (Medical page 22).3 Mrs. Wood's
initial position at EUB was as a salesperson. (Hearing page 24). Her duties included
selling the radio spots, gathering information to write the spot, and collections and
billing. (Hearing page 24). She was required to call each of her accounts at lease once
each week. (Hearings page 30). From the beginning, her work involved a significant
amount of stress.
Mrs. Wood was given 50 accounts when she first started. (Hearing page 25). She
was responsible for every aspect of these accounts and was the key person responsible for
all contact with the client as well as all administrative duties. (Hearing page 24). In 1981
she was sent to her first "boot camp" training required by EUB. (Hearing pages 24-25).
The training was extremely intense and involved public ridicule. (Hearing pages 24-25).
She attended this training about once each year for the entire time she worked at EUB.
(Hearing page 25).
Mrs. Wood's responsibilities at EUB rapidly increased. Once she learned the
ropes she was given more and more accounts to handle.
2

(Hearing page 28). EUB

The hearing transcript is identified in the record as page 149. The original transcript
numbering is then used to identify the pages within the transcript. For ease of reference
the hearing transcript will simply be identified as "Hearing" in this brief.
3
The medical records exhibit is identified in the record as page 148. The original
numbering of the medical records exhibit used at the administrative level is the used to
identify pages within the medical record. For ease of reference the medical records
exhibit is identified as "Medical" in this brief.
4-

downsized and within the first five years of working at EUB the sales staff had dropped
from four to two. The two remaining salespeople handled all of the accounts previously
handled by four. (Hearing page 28). In 1986 EUB started a shopping show business,
which again doubled Mrs. Wood's workload. (Hearing page 32). By the late 1980's
Mrs. Wood was the only sales person and was responsible for all 200 of EUB's accounts.
(Hearing pages 37-38). Other salespeople were hired but the turnover was so frequent
that Mrs. Wood was responsible for all of the accounts for years at a time. (Hearing page
41). In 1997 she became the sales manager and assumed the responsibilities of hiring and
training new salespeople as well as handling her own accounts. (Hearing pages 55-56).
During her entire employment at EUB Mrs. Wood was under considerable stress.
She carried two cell phones and often received calls as early as 5:00 A.M. and as late as
11:00 P.M. (Hearing page 47). It was not uncommon for both phones to be ringing at
the same time. (Hearing page 46). Her job also involved considerable travel to meet
with clients and help produce early morning remote radio shows. (Hearing pages 38 &
39). She was taught and encouraged to just get the job done no matter what it took.
(Hearing page 95). One fellow employee was even yelled at because she did not answer
the phone while she was in the bathroom. (Hearing page 62). Mrs. Wood often began
work at 5:00 A.M. when she wrote the memos she needed to write for the day. (Hearing
page 46). She would then be at the office by 7:30 A.M. (Hearing page 59). She would
often work until 6:00 or 7:00 P.M., or even later. (Hearing page 59). She was available
even on weekends to answer her telephones. (Hearing page 47). The company policy
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was that she was available from 8:30 A.M. until 5:30 P.M, (Hearing page 61), but she
was told to do whatever it took to get the job done, (Hearing page 95).
Aside from the stress of being available at all hours, Mrs. Wood was frequently
yelled at by the owner of EUB, Tom Anderson, and "ripped" by her clients. (Hearing
pages 107-08). She had full responsibility for her accounts from sale to collection.
(Hearing page 86). Even if someone else made a mistake she took the blame. (Hearing
pages 46-47). Mrs. Wood always did her job no matter what it took because she lived in
fear that someone would check her work and find that she had not done what she was
supposed to have done. (Hearing page 83).
Mr. Anderson was an intense boss who did not have a lot of patience. (Hearing
page 84). Other employees had quit because the stress level was too high for them.
(Hearing page 87). Mr. Anderson yelled at Mrs. Wood in front of others at the station,
during meetings, and while talking with clients. (Hearing pages 101-02 & 108). Mr.
Anderson told her that if someone made him mad then he would get even and the person
would not know where it came from. (Hearing page 100). She feared that if she left
EUB Mr. Anderson would make sure that she was not able to find work in Price again.
(Hearing page 99).
Mrs. Wood experienced her first episode of significant mental stress in 1986 while
in the "boot camp" training. (Hearing page 32). When she returned from the boot camp
she took a medical leave of absence at her doctor's recommendation. (Hearing page 32,
Medical page 38). When she attempted to return to work after being away for about a
month her salary was cut in half. (Hearing page 85-86). She remained off work for
6

several months and had begun another job before she was invited to return to EUB at the
regular starting salary for a new EUB salesperson. (Hearing page 35).
She continued to have anxiety attacks at various stressful times of work such as
Christmas. (Hearing page 63). She began taking medications to help her with repeated
panic attacks and spent considerable time in relaxation activities. (Hearing page 64). She
did not seek therapy or psychiatric care. (Hearing pages 64-65).
On March 16, 2000, Mrs. Wood had a nervous breakdown. (Hearing page 44).
She began crying and was unable to stop. (Hearing page 44). She was completely nonfunctional and her husband had to call EUB to let them know she would not be coming
in. (Hearing pages 77-78). All of the parties agreed that Mrs. Wood was disabled at the
time of the hearing because of her anxiety. (Hearing pages 13 & 17).
Facts Supporting Mrs, Wood's Disability Claim
Mrs. Wood saw several physicians to treat her anxiety. She began treatment with
Dr. Morgan who prescribed her medications and took her off work for a few weeks.
(Medical pages 23-25). On May 15, 2000, Dr. Morgan wrote a prescription taking Mrs.
Wood off work for at least three to four months because of stress. (Medical page 21).
Dr. Morgan's notes reflect that Mrs. Wood continued to experience significant anxiety,
that she was easily tearful, suffering panic attacks, crying spells, headaches, sleep
disturbance, fear of being in public, fear of driving, fear of work, racing heart, and
shortness of breath. (Medical page 22). On October 14, 2000, Dr. Morgan took Mrs.
Wood off work for an undetermined period of time because of her inability to be around
people. (Medical page 17). In a letter dated March 5, 2002, Dr. Morgan stated that Mrs.
7

Wood's stress and anxiety were directly related to her employment. (Medical page 11A).
Dr. Morgan stated in this letter that Mrs. Wood's stress increases significantly when she
contemplates a return to work and that Mrs. Wood will not be able to return to work
because of this stress. (Medical page 11A).
Mrs. Wood also began seeing Dr. Carlisle, a psychologist. Dr. Carlisle noted that
Mrs. Wood became more stressed when she heard the radio. (Medical page 48). He
noted that she wanted to return to work and felt that she had let everyone down because
she had left. (Medical page 46). Nine months after leaving work she was still crying at
every therapy session because she could not go back to work. (Medical page 46). Dr.
Carlisle stated that Mrs. Wood was married to her job as much if not more than she was
married to her husband. (Medical page 48). He determined that her breakdown came
from accumulated stress over a period of several years. (Medical page 48). At the time
of this note in November of 2001, Dr. Carlisle did not believe that Mrs. Wood would ever
be able to work a full-time job again. (Medical page 48). In a letter dated November 27,
2000, Dr. Carlisle stated that "the pressures of her job have been extreme" and that "there
is no doubt in my mind that this is related to her work." (Medical page 45).
Mrs. Wood also saw Karl Kraync at the division of rehabilitation services to help
her find new employment. (R. 34-35). Mr. Kraync provided the only assessment in the
record from a vocational perspective about the nature of Mrs. Wood's work.

He

determined that the stress of Mrs. Wood's work was "intense." (R. page 35). He also
stated that Mrs. Wood was not employable for the foreseeable future. (R. page 35).
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Mrs. Wood testified at the hearing that her condition has significantly improved
since she left work. (Hearing page 81). But her psychologist told her that an attempt to
return to work could be fatal. (Hearing page 82).
Facts Supporting the Appeals Board
Dr. George Mooney saw Mrs. Wood at the request of the respondents. (R. 148-1
to 148-10). Like all others who have evaluated Mrs. Wood, Dr. Mooney determined that
she was unable to work despite the fact that her condition was generally improving.
(Medical page 8). Dr. Mooney believed that, contrary to the opinions of Dr. Morgan, Dr.
Carlisle, and Mr. Kraync, that Mrs. Wood's disability was only partially related to work.
(Medical page 9). In Dr. Mooney's opinion, Mrs. Wood suffered anxiety related to a
variety of sources including chronic pain, somatization, and stress intolerance due to a
bout with encephalitis. (Medical page 8). Dr. Mooney also opined that Mrs. Wood's
work environment involved only routine stresses both for EUB and for her industry in
general. (Medical page 9).
The Medical Panel authorized by the ALJ agreed with Dr. Mooney that only a
portion of Mrs. Wood's current disability was due to work related stress. (R. page 61).
The medical panel cited evidence of severe back pain and a possible predisposition to
stress and anxiety as other sources for her current mental difficulties. (R. page 61). The
medical panel apportioned 50% of the current disability to her work and EUB. (R. page
61).
Mrs. Wood testified that the stress she endured was the same stress endured by all
employees at EUB. (Hearing page 103). She testified that the average sales person
9

stayed on the job for a year or less because of the stress and that her twenty years staying
with the radio sales job was extremely unusual. (Hearing page 42). While Mrs. Wood
testified that she worked harder than anyone else, (Hearing page 58), she admitted that
the policy was that she was required to work from 8:30 A.M. to 5:30 P.M., the same as
the other employees. (Hearing pages 59-60). Mrs. Wood also offered hearsay testimony
that she heard from her "boot camp" trainer that 98% of all radio sales people end up
divorced because of the stress of the job. (Hearing page 31).
The Decision of the ALJ
The ALJ determined that Mrs. Wood was disabled and had met both the legal and
factual causation standards of the statute. The ALJ applied the two part test from Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-3-106 requiring that Mrs. Wood first show that she suffered an
extraordinary mental stress and second that the stress was extraordinary when judged in
comparison with national employment and non-employment life. (R. page 73). The ALJ
determined that the first part of the test was a subjective test where the term "stress" was
used to describe Mrs. Wood's reaction to a stimulus. (R. page 73). The ALJ determined
that the second part of the test was an objective test where the term "stress" was used by
the legislature to refer to the stimuli that caused her condition. (R. page 73). The ALJ
objectively compared the "stress" in step two to the "usual stress of everyday work and
non-work life generally in the late 20th century." (R. page 73).
The ALJ found that Mrs. Wood suffered a nervous breakdown that resulted in an
anxiety disorder marked by depression and severe panic attacks. (R. page 73). The ALJ
found that Mrs. Wood experienced symptoms such as being unable to easily leave her
10

home, difficulty in social situations, and difficulty riding in a car. (R. page 73). The ALJ
concluded that these facts established an extraordinary reaction to the work stresses
sufficient to satisfy step one of the test. (R. page 73).
The ALJ found that Mrs. Wood's workplace was extraordinarily stressful because
Mrs. Wood was required to work all hours of the day and night as well as weekends; she
was required to work more than a forty-hour work week; she was routinely required to
pick up the work loads of other employees when they quit; because, aside from her
regular duties Mrs. Wood was required to train new employees; she was demoted for
taking a medical leave of absence; she was required to be available for phone calls on two
cell phones from the early morning to late night; she was subject to public reprimand
both herself and as witness to the reprimand of other employees; she was required to
attend "boot camp" training seminars where she was humiliated in front of others; she
was the responsible party for the radio station, taking the blame for any mistakes whether
she made them or not; and she was often the only person responsible for EUB's entire
account list. (R. pages 74-75). The ALJ concluded that these facts were sufficient to
establish that Mrs. Wood worked in an environment that exposed her to an extraordinary
amount of mental stress when compared with national employment and non-employment
life. (R. pages 75-76). Thus, the ALJ concluded that Mrs. Wood satisfied both of the
prongs and was disabled within the meaning of the Utah Occupational Disease Act. (R.
page 76).
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The Decision of the Appeals Board
The Appeals Board determined in a 2-1 split decision that Mrs. Wood did not meet
the legal causation standard of the statute. The Appeals Board first determined that the
term "stress" referred to a causative stimulus as it is used in the statute. (R. page 140).
The Appeals Board held that Mrs. Wood had to show that the stress she suffered was
extraordinary when objectively compared with the normal stress of modern employment
and non-employment life. (R. page 141). The Appeals Board then looked at several
factors concerning the stress at Mrs. Wood's work including the heavy work load, the
long hours, and her intense and powerful supervisor. (R. page 141). The Appeals Board
cited Mrs. Wood's testimony that all other sales people at her station were under the same
stress as she was. (R. page 141). Based on these facts, the Appeals Board concluded that
the stress at Mrs. Wood's job was substantial but that it was not extraordinary when
compared with the demands of modern employment and nonemployment life. (R. page
141).
The Dissent of Mr. Hatch
Mr. Hatch argued in his dissent that the majority applied the incorrect legal
causation standard in determining whether Mrs. Wood met the definition in the statute.
Mr. Hatch argued that the majority did not apply the national employment and
nonemployment standard but rather applied a standard specific to both Mrs. Wood's
workplace and her industry. (R. page 142). Mr. Hatch concluded that when compared
with the national employment and nonemployment life rather that the more narrow
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application made by the majority, Mrs. Wood's work stress was extraordinary and he
would have affirmed the ALJ decision. (R. page 143).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The standard of review in this case is the correction of error standard because the
issue concerns whether the Labor Commission correctly applied Section 106 of the
Occupational Disease Act to the facts of this case. Section 106 requires that an employee
show both legal and medical causation to establish a mental stress claim. Legal causation
requires that the employee establish that the stresses of his or her workplace were
extraordinary when compared to contemporary national employment and nonemployment
life. In the present case, the Appeals Board failed to compare the stress of Mrs. Wood's
employment with contemporary national employment and nonemployment life. Instead
the Appeals Board compared her employment to her own profession. Thus, the Appeals
Board failed to correctly apply Section 106 and this Court should reverse and remand this
case for further consideration.
ARGUMENT
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 provides with regard to appellate court review of
agency decisions that
(4) the appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been
substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law
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(g) the agency action is based on a determination of fact, made or implied
by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record before the court.
Courts generally grant great deference to an agency's findings of fact and will
uphold them if they are supported by substantial evidence. Stokes v. Bd. of Review of the
Indus. Comm 'n of Utah, 832 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted). When making
a substantial evidence determination, the court reviews the entire record before the court.
Id. The Petitioner must marshal all of the evidence supporting the agency decision and
then show that despite the evidence the findings are not supported by substantial
evidence. Id. However, the substantial evidence rule does not apply when a reviewing
court is examining agency application or interpretation of statutory language.
When a reviewing court examines whether an agency correctly interpreted or
applied the law the court must first determined whether the agency was either expressly
or impliedly granted discretion to interpret the language in question. Stokes, 832 P.2d at
58. If there is no explicit or implicit grant of discretion a correction-of-error standard is
applied when reviewing the agency's interpretation or application of the statute. Id. The
Industrial Commission has not been given, either expressly or impliedly, discretion in
construing the specific language of the statute. Id. Therefore, because this case presents
the single issue of whether the agency correctly interpreted and/or applied Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-3-106, the correct standard of review here is whether the Appeals Board
correctly applied the statute to the facts of this case. Id.

14

II. THE LABOR COMMISSION APPEALS BOARD ERRED BY APPLYING
THE INCORRECT LEGAL CAUSATION STANDARD TO THE FACTS
OF THIS CASE
This case should be remanded for further consideration of whether the facts
establish that the stress Mrs. Wood was subject to was extraordinary when objectively
compared with contemporary national employment and nonemployment life. Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-3-106 establishes that mental stress claims are compensable under the Utah
Occupational Disease Act. Section 106(6) requires that the employee show both legal
and medical causation by a preponderance of the evidence to establish a compensable
claim.
Section 106 requires "proof of extraordinary mental stress arising predominantly
and directly from employment" to establish legal causation. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3106(2)(a). Section 106(2)(b) provides that the extraordinary nature of the stress should
be judged "according to an objective standard in comparison with contemporary national
employment and nonemployment life." The issue in this case concerns whether the
Appeals Board correctly applied this definition of extraordinary stress to the facts of the
case.
Section 106 closely follows the principles established in Allen v. Industrial
Commission, 729 P.2d. 15 (Utah 1986) for evaluation of cases where the claimant suffers
from a preexisting condition. The Court in Allen sought to reconcile several conflicting
lines of cases into a more manageable umbrella analysis. Part of this analysis focused on
a person who brought a preexisting condition to the workplace. The Court set forth a rule
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that required the employee to show both legal and medical causation in a manner similar
to Section 106.
For legal causation, Allen requires that the employee show that the employment
"contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday life
because of his condition."

Allen, 729 P.2d at 25.

The Court cautioned that the

precipitating exertion should not be compared with the usual exertions of the individual
worker but with usual exertions of nonemployment life. Id. at 26 Therefore, the rule
adopted by the Court requires exertion be compared with "exertions of normal
nonemployment life of this or any other person." Id. at 26 (citations omitted).
In Stouffer Foods Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 801 P.2d 179
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), this Court applied the Allen test in the context of a claim for a
repetitive stress injury. The employee, Green, was hired by Stouffer to breakdown and
clean food processing equipment. Part of his job required that he use high pressure hoses
to clean the equipment. The handles of the hoses Green used required him to constantly
apply pressure. Id. at 180. After about two weeks of work Green's hands and wrists
were hurting so badly that he was unable to continue. Id. Green was diagnosed with
carpal tunnel syndrome. Id. at 181. The Court looked whether the repetitive use of the
hose was sufficient to establish an injury under Allen.
The Court found that repeated exposure to what may generally be considered usual
exertion may satisfy the requirements of Allen if the amount of exposure was greater than
that experienced in normal everyday life by most people. The Court began by reiterating
the principle in Allen that the extraordinary nature of the exertion is not judged in
16

comparison with the particular employee's usual exertion but with the usual exertions of
normal nonemployment life in general. Stouffer, 801 P.2d at 183. The Court found that
while using a hose similar to the one Green used may be typical of everyday life, the
constant uses Green was exposed to for hours at a time were not typical nonemployment
activity. Id. The Court stated that "the test is not whether the type of exertion which
caused the injury is unknown in employment life, but whether the cumulative workrelated exertion exceeds the normal level in nonemployment life. Id. at 184.
The legal causation standard provided in Section 106 exactly mirrors the legal
causation standard of Allen except that it adds the additional requirement that the stress
be extraordinary when objectively compared with national employment life.4 As Allen
and Stouffer make clear, it is not appropriate to look at the employee's particular stresses
when determining legal causation.

The comparison for extraordinary stress must be

made to national employment and nonemployment life in general. Furthermore, the
extent of repetitive exposure to the same sort of stress must be objectively compared to
the exposure to that stress in national employment and nonemployment life, not the
particular requirements of that person's job or the stresses in that person's personal life.
With these principles of law in mind, Mrs. Wood has clearly sustained her burden of
showing that she was exposed to extraordinary stress when objectively compared to
national employment and non-employment life. Mrs. Wood was subject to many stresses
that we are all subject to in our regular lives at work and away from work. However, for
Section 106 was first enacted in 1995, about ten years after the Allen decision. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that the legislature based the statute on Allen and intended that Allen and its
progeny be used to provide guidance in applying and interpreting its specific provisions.
17

her those stresses were constant and unrelenting. She was required to handle a heavy
workload that required that she begin work at 5:00 A.M. and often continue working until
6:00 P.M. or even later. She had to be constantly available to her boss and her customers
who both frequently yelled at her and criticized her work. She was often the only person
responsible for her employer's entire list of accounts and she managed every aspect of
those accounts from sales to collections. She took the blame for everything that went
wrong with an account even if she was not personally responsible because she was the
face of the radio station to its clients. The stressfulness of her work is manifested by the
fact that most of the station's sales people did not last more than a year.
The Appeals Board supports its decision with very little in the way of facts. The
majority opinion states that many occupations impose demands on worker time and
impose pressures for performance.

The decision specifically cited Mrs. Wood's

testimony that all radio sales positions involved the same types of demands that she
experienced. This reasoning exposes the fact that the Appeals Board did not objectively
compare Mrs. Wood's work environment with national employment and nonemployment
life. In fact, the word "national" does not appear in the Appeals Board analysis nor does
mention any nonemployment life.

Contrary to the law, the Appeals Board failed to

objectively compare Mrs. Wood's work environment to contemporary national
employment and nonemployment life.
Furthermore, the only evidence addressing whether Mrs. Wood's work environment
was more stressful than others supports her claim.

The letter from her vocational

counselor, Karl Kraync, states that Mrs. Wood was subject to "long term and intense
18

occupational stress." (R. 35). He states further that Mrs. Wood "worked in an intensely
competitive and driving environment for an extended period of time." Id. This evidence
is supported by the opinions of Drs. Morgan and Carlisle who both stated that Mrs.
Wood's work environment was extraordinarily stressful.

The Respondents did not

introduce any vocational evidence addressing the nature of Mrs. Wood's work stress.
While it can be fairly said that all workers are exposed to the sorts of stresses Mrs. Wood
experienced at some point in their lives, very few are exposed to these stresses on a
constant basis for twenty years from morning 'till night. A more narrow application of
Section 106 would eviscerate the purpose and effect of the statute. Therefore, the Court
should remand this case for reconsideration of the facts as they objectively apply to
contemporary national employment and nonemployment life.
CONCLUSION
Section 106 requires that the Labor Commission objectively evaluate mental stress
claims in comparison to contemporary national employment and nonemployment life.
The Appeals Board evaluated Mrs. Wood's case by referencing other jobs similar to Mrs.
Wood's rather that national employment and nonemployment life as whole. Thus, the
Court should remand this case with the instruction that the Appeals Board apply the
"contemporary national employment and nonemployment" life test to the facts of this
case.
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DATED this^/^day of March 2005.
MYLER LAW OFFICE

ray/i5arnes
Bradford D. Myler
Attorney's for Petitioner
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